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Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000500010094-325X1A

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26 June 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT:**

**Briefing Note on "Immediate and  
Continuing Photo Reconnaissance  
of Communist China" (USIB-D-  
41, 5/6; COMOR-D-2/18)**

1. Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance recommendations in the attached paper stem directly from the special meeting of the United States Intelligence Board of last Friday and reflect the urgency of the Secretary of Defense on the need for photo reconnaissance over China.

2. At the tabs in this paper are the detailed targets organized by category which will be followed in this briefing note. The proposed frequency of coverage (not number of missions) is indicated:

Tab A--Buildup area in ChiCom--recommends daily coverage of three coastal areas; weekly coverage of coastal area, key rail lines, and key airfields; biweekly coverage of bomber airfields and peripheral deployment airfields.

Comment: It is anticipated that the State Department would be willing to go for this at this time provided there was a built-in device to turn off the routine when the urgent need subsides. State could press for such turn-off at anytime in COMOR or the Board or the Special Group. They may propose a weekly report to the Special Group by COMOR to insure that this question is held under constant review.

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Series B

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Tab B--South China--recommends initial coverage only. Surveillance to depend on Southeast Asia situation plus six-month periodic updating.

Comment: Three missions are already approved. Initial coverage may or may not require more missions; depends entirely on weather. State will likely say periodic updating can await later approval. This seems reasonable.

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Tab C--Northeast China-- recommends initial coverage of targets not covered in [ ] mission [ ] recently acquired and not yet fully exploited. Six-month periodic updating. Surveillance dependent on Korean situation.

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Comment: State will be reluctant on this--too wide open. They might settle for a single additional mission to obtain what we didn't get on [ ] mission [ ] They will want more time to study this proposal as well as Tabs D and E.

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Tab D--Highest Priority Initial Coverage Objectives--All China-- recommends earliest possible initial coverage of these objectives on which there is little or no photo coverage in last three years.

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Comment: Some of these objectives would be covered incident to any missions directed at the objectives in the three foregoing Tabs. There are, however, targets under this Tab which are extra to the previous Tabs.

Comment: No haste in reaching this decision.

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General Comment:

3. DIA is seizing the current buildup emergency to push through a program approval which will make unnecessary the task, which they find burdensome and unnecessary, of going back time after time for permission to overfly China. State on the other hand, while recognizing the need to loosen up in the present emergency, will look askance at the idea of a blank check.

4. My personal recommendation is that we seek to get a wider latitude than the two missions left in the emergency area. At the moment we are not hurting for more missions in South China since we still have three on the books. I recommend that we not seek missions in other areas until there has been time for the readout of [redacted]

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James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:

USIB-D-41.5/6

C/SRS/OSA/DDR:JQRебер:bs

Copy 1--DCI  
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5--AC/DCI  
6--AD/OCI  
7--AD/ONE  
8--AD/OSI  
9--AD/ORR  
10--CFE  
11--C/SRS/OSA/DDR

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